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Karen Devine

Abstract

This article examines the content of concepts of neutrality articulated in elite and public discourses in the context of the development of the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In parallel with security and defence policy developments in successive EU treaties, many argue that the meaning of neutrality has been re-conceptualized by elites in EU 'neutral' member states (specifically, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) to the point of irrelevance and inevitable demise. Others argue that the concept of 'military' neutrality, as it is termed by elites in Ireland, or 'military non-alignment', as it is termed by elites in Austria, Sweden and Finland, meaning non-membership of military alliances, is compatible with the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty. An investigation of these paradoxical discursive claims as to the status of neutrality yields findings of a divergence in public 'active' and elite 'military' concepts of neutrality that embodies competing foreign policy agendas. These competing, value-laden, concepts reflect tensions between, on the one hand, the cultural influences of a domestic constituency holding strong national identities and role-conceptions informed by a postcolonial or anti-imperialist legacy and, on the other hand, elite socialization influences of 'global actor' and common defence-supported identity ambitions encountered at the EU level that can induce discursively subtle yet materially significant shifts in neutral state foreign policy. The article concludes with an analysis of the compatibility of both 'military' neutrality and the 'active' concept of neutrality with the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty and draws conclusions on the future role of neutrality both inside and outside the EU framework.

Keywords

Austria, EU CSDP, Ireland, 'Lisbon Treaty' mutual defence clause, neutrality, Sweden

Introduction

Neutrality is an 'illusive concept' (Andrén, 1991: 67), a 'wide-ranging, elastic concept' (Joenniemi, 1993: 289) and 'bears more than its fair share of different connotations'

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(Keatinge, 1984: 3). Like many other commonly used political concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘sovereignty’, neutrality is an essentially contested concept – the content of the concept, with different emphasis on legal, political, ideological, economic and military dimensions and its ‘proper’ formulation and practice, can be interpreted antithetically and disputed (see Agius and Devine, [this issue]). The lack of universal or intersubjective agreement on the meaning of neutrality is a political puzzle worthy of investigation in the context of an ongoing political struggle over the content of the concept between different agents in their attempts to achieve varying political goals at the national, regional and international levels.

This article seeks to establish the timing and nature of changes in the discursive content of neutrality in parallel with the development of European Union (EU) foreign, security and defence policy (see Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue]). Although there is a substantial literature on the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (renamed ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ through the Lisbon Treaty (shorthand for ‘the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community’)) (e.g. Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Holland, 2005) and a smaller literature drawing attention to changes to neutrality in Europe and the conduct of European neutrals (Jessup, 1936; Ogley, 1970; Neuhold and Thalberg, 1984; Kruzal and Haltzel, 1989; Neuhold, 1992) and individual studies of neutral states (Jakobsen, 1969; Salmon, 1989; Af Malmberg, 2001; Bischof et al., 2001; Agius, 2006), to date, variability in the two concepts has not been compared directly in a qualitative, chronological analysis. The content of the concept of neutrality is examined in the cases of Austria, Sweden and Ireland in a pre-accession period from the 1960s to 1970s for Ireland and from the 1980s to 1990s for the former two cases using referendum debates, parliamentary speeches, White Papers, policy documents and media op-eds. The last phase examines the concept of neutrality from the time of the agreement to merge the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) military alliance reached by the European Council in December 1999, incorporating the negotiations on the inclusion of the WEU’s mutual defence clause in the draft ‘Constitution for Europe’ in 2002–2003, until the completion of the WEU–EU merger several years later through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. These CSDP developments are arguably important predictors in expectations of changes in elite-formulated neutrality concepts.

Irish discourse is heavily focused on (1) because it was the first ‘case-study’ of a neutral joining the EEC and sets the initial parameters of the debate that provides a basis for assessing the continuity of discourses enabling successive neutral state accessions to the EU and (2) because the requirement of binding referendums on successive EC treaties has forced Irish elites to grapple with this issue given the long-standing support for neutrality by the veto card-wielding public, compared with the lighter political pressures on other neutral state elites. Finland is considered as a case apart, as the tradition is less firmly rooted and Finnish elites appear to have experienced comparatively little political pressure in shedding neutrality (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001: 70), so it features only sporadically, as a juxtaposed, quasi-neutral case (until recently, elites have described Finland as ‘militarily non-aligned’). Taken together, these cases should provide an empirical basis to ascertain (1) whether state elites exhibit characteristics of elite

socialization (Checkel, 2005) and have followed a ‘logic of appropriateness’ according to the given international norm in the pursuit of their policy aims and (2) whether their own internal standards of appropriateness, taking into account past practices of neutrality, are consistent over time. The article also evaluates (*vis-à-vis* elite concepts of neutrality) the scope and content of the neutrality concepts supported by public opinion in these states (see Table 1) using quantitative and qualitative public opinion data. This provides evidence of the degree of norm overlap and implementation (Wiener and Puetter, 2009: 6) across several levels of analysis.

Changes in elite discourses on neutrality can be understood in the context of a ‘two level game’ framework in which neutral state governments at the ‘EU table’ level agree to ESDP/CSDP measures that may impact upon or eradicate neutrality, and at the ‘domestic table’ have to face their state populations that wish to retain neutrality and hold direct veto cards through votes in binding referendums on EU treaties containing these ESDP/CSDP measures and/or indirect veto cards through votes in national and European elections (see Miles, 1998: 346–8). In the absence of sufficient empirical evidence to establish direct causation, the relationship between the two variables is hypothesized as correlative rather than causative: elite agreements on ESDP/CSDP developments precede changes to elite concepts of neutrality; changes in the neutrality concept can set the parameters of governmental discursive claims about the degenerative impact of the EU’s ESDP/CSDP on neutrality. To paraphrase Putnam (1988: 434), ‘players (and kibitzers) will tolerate some differences in rhetoric between the two games, but in the end either [neutrality] is retained or it isn’t’. The changes in neutrality concepts in elite discourses are mapped in parallel with a timetable of Treaty-based ESDP/CSDP developments not only to draw conclusions on the compatibility of neutrality with ESDP/CSDP but also to assess the political and legal status of the policies of neutrality formerly and currently espoused by a minority of member states in the EU. Conclusions on the retention of neutrality or otherwise raise further questions: first, whether ‘neutrality’ is still an effective narrative used by elites for domestic consumption in order to take into account public attachments to neutrality, and, second, whether there is dissonance between the type of foreign policy expectations held by the public in their understanding of neutrality *vis-à-vis* the foreign policy options that elites could or intend to exercise within the strategic and political context of CSDP.

The approach

In efforts to understand the contested neutrality concepts at play in domestic-EU politics, it is useful to draw on a post-structuralist discourse theoretic approach and Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguist concept of ‘sign’ as a tool. To add critical and analytical purchase, aspects of critical constructivism and critical discourse analysis are melded into an overall approach.¹

Post-structuralist discourse theory conceives of neutrality as a subject constructed and constituted on the basis of a discursive matrix in two ways: discourses enable or constrain what is ‘thinkable’ in a given discursive context and they reward or punish ideas, institutions and state policy practices that are congruent or deviant with political boundaries set (in this case, the boundaries of the EU’s foreign policy ambitions and the

CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty). Foucaultian discursive analysis entails engagement with four questions: (1) which object or area of knowledge is discursively produced, (2) according to what logic is the terminology constructed, (3) who authorized it, (4) which strategic goals are being produced in the discourse (Diaz-Bone et al., 2008: 11). On this basis, the content of the concept of neutrality is discursively produced, embodying a particular set of foreign policy goals articulated by agents such as a government, a state leader or a member of the public that are motivated by a set of values arising from a particular strategic or normative world-view.

The 'sign' is a linguistic concept that consists of two parts: form and content. The form is called the 'signifier': it is the word, manifested in the form of the letters n-e-u-t-r-a-l-i-t-y, or in the sound created when the word is spoken. The content is called the 'signified': it is the idea that is associated with the word, the meaning of the word. One way to understand the debate on neutrality is to think of the concept of 'neutrality' as comprising these two parts: the 'signifier' and the 'signified'. A post-structuralist approach makes the important point that there is no natural or inevitable link between the signifier (the word/form) and the signified (the meaning/content) (Torfing, 1999: 50, 57, 89). This break between the word and its meaning allows us to think of the concept of neutrality as an empty basket or 'floating signifier' (Torfing, 1999: 87–9, 98–9) that can be filled with different contents by agents through competing discursive articulations, permitting the premise that 'neutrality' can have a number of different meanings linked to different actors, values and goals. For example, Möller and Bjereld (2010: 376) note that 'Sweden developed a policy of neutrality with an activist content' in the Cold War era, as did Austria and Ireland (discussed later). This 'active' concept of neutrality has been retained by a majority of publics in neutral states, despite their respective governing elites' adoption of the concepts of 'military neutrality' and 'military non-alignment'. Applying the above framework to the present era, one can hypothesize that supporters of 'active' neutrality based on a cosmopolitan world-view and motivated by the values of non-aggression, peace-promotion and self-determination would fill the floating signifier of neutrality with very different content to those with a regional EU world-view who reject neutrality and favour 'military solidarity' in pursuit of the status of 'global actor' for the EU (Ferreira-Pereira and Groom, 2010: 605).

The assumption that discourses can only be understood with reference to their social, political and cultural context (Titscher et al., 2000: 166; Hansen, 2006: 29) is also relevant because this article links change in the content of neutrality concepts at the government-state level with developments in CSDP at the supranational EU level. Each context is characterized by multiple discourses, with some discourses dominant (hegemonic, governing, ruling) and others challenging (counter-hegemonic, resisting, alternative or subaltern) (Vucetic, 2010: 6). Critical constructivism posits that statist discourses are more powerful than others because they partake of institutional power, and in turn reproduce that power: 'All things being equal, the foreign policy representations constructed by state officials have *prima facie* plausibility compared to other representations because these officials are themselves constituted as the legitimate voices of the "state"' (Weldes, 1998: 221). Critical constructivism is also normatively concerned with the practice of subjugating dissenting public voices vis-à-vis government policy in democratic political systems (Devine, 2006: 116–17, 2008: 463–4). In this case, the

public's concept of neutrality has remained relatively unchanged in the context of continued adherence to the cultural and ideological values underpinning their support for neutrality (discussed later, see also Brommesson, 2010: 230): with the public concept potentially (1) competing with CSDP and (2) different enough to constitute a challenge to their own governments' concepts of 'military neutrality' or 'military non-alignment', it is subjugated as a result of the government monopoly over state foreign policy and the legally binding status of the Lisbon Treaty.

This subjugation is seen in governments' engagement in doublespeak in a two-level game to convince their publics that 'military non-alignment' in the Swedish case (Christiansson, 2010: 30), 'non-allied' status in the Austrian case and 'military neutrality' in the Irish case (Devine, 2009: 473–5) are preserved. Notably, the doublespeak leads to confusion over the meaning of solidarity in military terms (Christiansson, 2010: 29–33). In this context, the discursive approach is useful in the analysis of deception and disinformation (Hansen, 2006: 28, 33) and pays close attention to empirical manifestations such as 'meaningful silences'. For example, elite silences on the mutual defence clause in the Lisbon Treaty's CSDP in Sweden (Christiansson, 2010: 32) and Ireland (Devine, 2010: 15) are meaningful: the European Commission's Lisbon Treaty booklet distributed to the Irish public during the two referendums in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty was misleading in omitting any reference to the Article 42.7 mutual defence clause – a remarkable silence given that the European Commission singled out the mutual defence clause as one of the most significant aspects of the Lisbon Treaty after it had been signed in December 2007, because it would 'allow the emergence of a true common European defence. It will introduce a mutual defence clause and a solidarity clause ...' (Barroso, 2007).² Another 'meaningful silence' is the very recent disappearance of the 'neutrality' and 'military non-alignment/alliance' nodal points from these states' foreign policy discourses (Devine, 2009: 472; Möller and Bjereld, 2010: 365; e.g. Ritter, 2011).

The final critical premise of the approach is that the consequences of such discursive struggles can create conditions that facilitate significant legal and foreign policy change in nation-states and at the EU level. Discourse is not just a matter of talk or text, discourse is constitutive of social and political development and a medium used by political agents to create perceptions of, and conditions for, seemingly natural or sensible policy innovation. Policy issues are defined and policy is made through discursive representational practices and discursive struggles. Texts, in this approach, are a significant form of political activity: they structure policy options and form a basis for the legitimation of political action (Weldes, 1998: 223; Milliken, 1999: 240).

NATO and the EU have started to take discourse seriously for these purposes in recent years, in terms of increased budget allocations, activities in public diplomacy and the creation of new public diplomacy agencies. In October 2002, the European Commission identified a new priority as an information topic for dissemination, 'the role of the European Union in the world' (2002: 13). In 2007, the EU started seriously to engage in external public diplomacy, using the fiftieth anniversary 'to launch a huge public diplomacy exercise across the world' (European Commission, 2007: 13). The European Commission's External Relations DG (since taken over by the EU's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) under the Lisbon Treaty) budget in 2008 had an allocation of €3 million that includes spending on 'information

activities ... on the aims and development of the common foreign and security policy'. 'Indirect' discourse production involves funding think-tank publications and non-peer-reviewed academic publications: as NATO puts it, 'at other times, policy issues are better communicated by third parties, such as think tanks and academics, than through official statements' (Babst, 2009: 6). Part of the EU's External Relations Information programmes budget of nearly €11m was spent on 'support for the information activities of opinion leaders that are consistent with the European Union's priorities' (Article 19 11 02 Draft EU Budget, 2008). These EU-funded agents, including 'think-tank' researchers and university-based academics, are significant sources of CSDP/neutrality discourses in neutral states; they are examined in this article in addition to the 'direct' discourse generated by the EU. Both 'direct' and 'indirect' CSDP discourses provide evidence of EU foreign policy interests, norms and values that can be compared with those in the foreign security and defence policy discourses of the elites in the neutral states to establish evidence of 'elite socialization', and provide material to compare with national role conceptions in public attachments to neutrality.

1960s–1980s concepts of neutrality: Accession to the EEC and ratification of the SEA

During the Cold War, the neutral states attempted to stay aloof from the East–West conflict – the conflict that formed the shared history and sense of solidarity for NATO members, five of whom (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy) went on to form the European Coal and Steel Community together with West Germany, and, in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus, the neutrals' twentieth-century experience, history and world-view differed significantly from the Six (see Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue]). When Ireland began to pursue EEC membership it became apparent – although according to Keogh it was 'never explicitly stated' – that neutrality represented a 'special problem', in the words of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville; the Italians raised 'doubts about the Irish on economic and political grounds – they are not members of NATO' (Keogh, 1997: 92, 96). In July 1962, Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Spaak said it would be difficult for neutral states to become members of the Common Market because its main aims included an integrated defence policy and a common foreign policy (starting a notable pattern of response, the then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) refused to comment on the report (*Dáil Éireann*, 196: 3379–3436)). Spaak was also an outspoken critic of association agreements requested by the neutrals in 1961 (Luif, 1992: 60–1) because he thought the neutrals would hamper the development of the EC due to a lack of agreement with the Rome Treaty's 'political philosophy'. Five years later, the then Belgian Prime Minister Mr van den Boeynants stated that 'the Six wished to see members of the EEC also members of NATO' (Maher, 1986: 220).

However, neutrality was also incompatible with the vision of a future European common foreign policy and identity tied to an eventual common defence, captured in the 'Declaration on European Identity' by the nine EEC Foreign Ministers (Council of Ministers, 1973) that embodied a political goal to achieve a European Union with common attitudes, actions and positions in foreign policy, coupled with NATO members'

concept of security as provided by US nuclear weapons. The USA strongly opposed membership applications of 'neutrals' because it envisaged the EEC becoming a potentially stronger bulwark against communism should NATO's strength and commitment to defend the West weaken (Schlesinger, 1972: 126, 128; Wylie, 2006: 50). This prompted Taoiseach Sean Lemass, in July 1962, to privately assure US elite figures that: 'We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without reservations as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence' (Maher, 1986: 152). Known as 'the Lemass doctrine', this stance was only iterated *outside* of Ireland to respective target audiences, and 'was not part of the rhetoric of succeeding generations of Irish politicians' (Keogh, 1989: 234).

The Fianna Fáil government negotiating the terms of Ireland's membership of the EEC had always denied offering during the accession negotiations that Ireland would enter into military commitments (*Dáil Éireann*, 259: 2444). This early 1960s era was identified as the start of a government strategy (mirroring a two-level game) of committing to a policy at the European level but denying any such commitment had been made to the Irish people at the domestic level because 'the strength of feeling domestically' towards neutrality 'could not be shaken' (*Dáil Éireann*, 327: 1404). Public adherence to neutrality was seen by government negotiators as a problem that might put their EEC membership application in doubt; they sought to ensure that domestic opposition to giving up neutrality did not come to the attention of the EEC (Keogh, 1997: 88–9). The government negotiators' tactic was to be 'as positive and as unqualified as possible in our acceptance of the political objectives of the Community' at the EEC table and, because of the strong public attachment to neutrality, to leave these objectives to be defined in the future (*Irish Times*, 1 January 1993) at the domestic table. McSweeney surmised that 'every effort was made to display abroad the characteristics of a worthy candidate for acceptance in Europe and to allay at home the fears that more might be given away by treaty obligations or compromise than the government was admitting' (1985: 127).

The government avoided any talk of neutrality prior to and during the 1972 accession referendum. Neutrality and a future EEC common defence were not mentioned in the White Paper on the terms of entry (*Irish Times*, 11 July 1975), nor was any incompatibility of EEC membership and neutrality pressed home to the Irish people (Devine, 2009: 473–4). The government insisted on 23 March 1972 that: 'it is clearly stated in the White Paper ... there are no military or defence commitments whatsoever in Ireland's acceptance of the Treaties of Rome and Paris. *Our obligations as a member of the Communities will not entail such commitments*' (emphasis added) (*Dáil Éireann*, 259: 2445) and fought the referendum on this basis, promoting 'a minimalist view of the implications of membership for national sovereignty (FitzGerald, 1991)'. The government ensured that ratification was secured 'on the basis of almost exclusively economic arguments' (FitzGerald, 2002: 80, 81). (The Finnish (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 24, 37), Swedish (Bieler, 2000: 118, 119) and Austrian elites (Bieler, 2000: 65, 95, 96, 102) employed the same tactics to secure their referendum victories.)³ Both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael differentiated NATO from a future EU military alliance (*Irish Times*, 4 July 1975) and their *de facto* position was that Ireland's neutrality would be waived in favour of assuming the core mutual defence commitment of a military alliance within an EU common security and defence policy, but they were careful never to state it definitively (*Dáil Éireann*, 334: 813; 330: 130–1).

'Active' characteristics associated with neutrality as a foreign policy

The centre-right political party Fine Gael adhered to 'active' neutrality until Garret FitzGerald (1995), an advocate of Irish membership of NATO since the 1940s, became leader and redefined neutrality into a narrow, singular concept of 'military neutrality', meaning 'non-participation in a military alliance ... not a member of NATO, WEU or any other alliance' (*Dáil Éireann*, 327: 1424). The pressure to preserve a semblance of neutrality came from public opinion (*Dáil Éireann*, 327: 1423) and Fine Gael's government coalition partner, the Labour Party, a party that adhered to a 'fundamental', 'active' or 'positive' concept of neutrality as an enduring position in a world of great power politics (and sought to continue Éamon de Valera's emphasis on the duty of small states to resist becoming 'tools of any great power' at the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva on 2nd July 1936 (cited in Dwyer, 1991: 209)). Sweden's Olof Palme's 1974 doctrine also enshrined the right of small states to resist superpower influence (Sundelius, 1987), as did Finland's Urho Kekkonen initiative to avoid involvement in great power rivalry (Faloon, 1982: 6). Avoidance of great power politics and entangling military alliances enabled these states' 'active' characteristics of neutrality: engaging in UN peacekeeping and the international arbitration of disputes; providing 'good offices', international meeting grounds and headquarters for international organizations, providing untied development aid; rejecting neo-colonial economic relations; engaging in nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; supporting self-determination of other nations, including decolonizing African states; resisting pressure to vote with major powers in UN resolutions; strengthening international law as a defence for small nations, and taking a clear moral stand on global issues (see Table 1). This active form of neutrality was to become deeply embedded in the national identities of the public in these states.

Neutrality was understood in elite discourses as the best foreign policy vehicle with which to achieve the above goals until the 2000s (see Beyer and Hofmann's matrices for theoretical expectations of norm change). For example, in November 1999, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh argued that non-participation in military alliances 'means that we are in a position to pursue an active and independent policy of disarmament ... these are the challenges for the twenty-first century. Not nuclear umbrellas and defence guarantees' (quoted by Lassinantti, 2001: 108). Other than FitzGerald's single reference to neutrality in parliament in the early 1980s, 'the zone of meaningful silences' on Irish neutrality continued until the Irish government was faced with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty of European Union (TEU) in the early 1990s and, within it, ambitions for a common defence.

Thus, public and elite characteristics of neutrality largely cohered in the post-war era up until membership of the EEC started to be seriously considered by a minority of the political elite (e.g. the Ministries of Finance/Prime Minister's Office in Sweden and Austria (Bieler, 2000: 84, 87), Ireland (Maher, 1986: 86, 117; Devine, 2009: 475) and Finland (Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 39, 40) see Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue], for a theoretical explanation of norm variance between elite and public). The Dooge report on developing European Political Cooperation is an important discursive trigger for the re-formulation of elite positions on neutrality. Examining elite discourses around EPC

Table 1. The content of elite and public neutrality concepts, 1950-date

Time	Actor	Ireland	Austria	Sweden
1950-1989	Elite	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. staying outside of the NATO and WEU military alliances 2. UN peacekeeping; 3. the 1961 nuclear non proliferation treaty; 4. decolonization initiatives; 5. opposing South African apartheid; 6. accepting refugees; 7. opposing US funding of South American paramilitaries; 8. increasing aid to the Third World and supporting Palestinian self-determination (<i>Dáil Éireann</i>, Vol. 327: Col. 1425-6). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. renouncing nuclear armament; 2. voting against major powers (UK, USSR, USA) in UN resolutions despite pressure to do otherwise; 3. supporting de-colonizing nations in Africa and Asia; 4. United Nations peacekeeping; 5. provision of non-partisan humanitarian aid to African states; 6. providing international meeting grounds and international organization headquarters and 7. engaging in détente activities (Schlesinger, 1972: 90, 125, 90-91, 91, 88). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. rejecting neo-colonial economic relations; 2. untied development aid budget (Ruth, 1984: 73-74); 3. supporting decolonization and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and 5. UN peacekeeping missions (Lassinantti, 2001: 103); 6. engaging in disarmament promotion and 7. international cooperation along with a desire for international arbitration of disputes and 8. strengthening of international law as a defense for small nations (Logue, 1989: 48). 9. taking a clear moral stand in important global situations (Widmer, 1989: 22).
	Public	<p>These characteristics embodied 'active', positive' or 'fundamental' neutrality in all three states (Keatinge, 1984: 32; Agius, 2006; Benke and Wodak, 2003: 281)</p> <p>Opinion polls conducted in the 1980s have shown that nearly two-thirds of the Irish population want to retain Irish neutrality (Marsh, 1992: 6).</p>	<p>In 1989, three quarters of Austrians surveyed said they would not give up neutrality for the sake of accession to the EC (Benke, 2003: 182).</p>	<p>A majority of Swedes felt the proposal that 'if the military situation in our proximity turns more threatening, Sweden should reconsider its present neutrality' was a bad one (1988, 1989 RIKS-SOM).</p>

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

Time	Actor	Ireland	Austria	Sweden
1990-1999	Elite	<p>The 1996 White Paper defined 'neutrality as ... non-membership of a military alliance' (Ireland, 1996: 51) and stated 'the Government will not be proposing that Ireland should seek membership of NATO or the Western European Union, or the assumption of their mutual defence guarantees' (1996: 147), defined as a central component of 'military neutrality' (e.g. <i>Dáil Éireann</i>, Vol. 327: Col. 1424).</p>	<p>In 1994, Foreign Minister Mock declared there was no contradiction between the obligations of an EU member-state and the core elements of neutrality, and thus Austria will join the EU as a neutral state' (Ausserpolitische Dokumentation 1995 in Liebhart, 2003: 31). In 1997 Andreas Khol of the ÖVP said 'In Europe, it is not neutrality that is called for today but solidarity' (Benke, 2003: 298-299).</p> <p>Between 8 in 10 and 2 in 3 Austrians supported neutrality in 1993-1996 Gallup polls (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003: 444) and 1995-1999 IMAS Surveys; a 1998 Linz survey showed that 7 in 10 Austrians supported neutrality. (Gärtner and Höll, 2001: 189). Neutrality is positively connoted with security and peace, freedom and sovereignty regained, self-determination, democracy and the welfare state, Austria's position in the international system and political self-definition (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003: 447; Benke, 2003).</p>	<p>PM Carlsson said 'A Swedish membership in the EC is compatible with the demands of a policy of neutrality' in June 1991 (Karvonen and Sundelius, 1996: 248). In November 1991, PM Bildt said 'in the light of our desire to fully participate in the work of the EU... "policy of neutrality" is no longer appropriate as an overall description of our foreign and security policy. The 'hard core' of security policy is 'non-participation in military alliances' (Herolf and Lindahl, 2000: 178).</p> <p>More than 2 in 3 felt 'Sweden should maintain its current policy of neutrality' (<i>Svensk Valundersökning</i>, 1991) and 'Sweden should pursue a policy of non-alignment, aiming at neutrality in war' (1995, 1996 Riks-SOM). Bjereld and Ekengren (1999: 510) categorized neutrality supporters as 'Accommodationists' (27%) and 'Isolationists' (46%) favouring foreign aid, taking a stand on conflicts and admitting refugees, and being critical of EU membership if it meant restrictions on autonomy (1999: 515) due to fears of ceding autonomy and power through alliance commitments (1999: 514).</p>
	Public	<p>In 1991, 'opposition to a formal military alliance – through a common defence policy within the EC – was expressed by 64% of those surveyed' (<i>Irish Times</i> 28 January). A 1996 poll showed 7 in 10 wanted to retain neutrality: 'in Irish public opinion, neutrality is a good thing...: it is tradition; it is independence; it is anti-militarism; it is anti-big power politics; it is pro-Third World; it was anti the new Cold War in the early 1980s and was and is against the spread of nuclear weapons.' (Sinnott, 1996).</p>		

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

Time	Actor	Ireland	Austria	Sweden
2000-2003	Elite	<p>'There is no such thing as... complete military neutrality' (<i>Irish Times</i>, January 18 2003). EU's mutual defence clause 'will need to be carefully studied' (Roche, 19 December 2002). 'The core of our neutrality...lies in independence of judgement and in being able to make up our minds about what is right for Ireland' (Cowen, 20 March 2003). Fine Gael opined 'Ireland should now define the circumstances under which it would be willing to depart from neutrality and take part in an EU defence entity' (February 2000); 'neutrality is no longer a viable position' (Brennock, 2003).</p>	<p>EU membership had superceded neutrality (Chancellor Schüssel, October 2001). In EU foreign policy there is 'no neutrality, only solidarity' (FM Ferrero-Waldner, 2001); since Austria's unconditional participation in the EU CFSP, its...Neutrality... has changed fundamentally... Austria's status...corresponds to that of...an alliance-free state... Austria will also support all future endeavours to realise the possibility of a collective European defence' (Austria, 2001). SPO accepted integrating Article V WEU military assistance clause into EU Treaty (Luif, 2001: 153).</p>	<p>In 2000, Sverker Åström said Sweden should continue to be non-aligned, but that all references to possible neutrality should be deleted (Herolf and Lindahl, 2000: 188). A new 2002 security doctrine dropped reference to neutrality (Möttölä, 2002: 24): 'Sweden pursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances. This security policy, making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in our vicinity, has served us well' but 'it is unrealistic to think that Sweden would remain neutral in a situation in which another EU member or one of Sweden's neighbours were attacked' (Lindh, February 2002, emphasis added).</p>
	Public	<p>In 2001/2, nearly 6 in 10 wish to retain neutrality (Devine, 2006: 295). 'Active' neutrality means 'peace promotion, nonaggression, primacy of the UN, and confinement of state military activity to UN peacekeeping, not being involved in wars, maintaining Ireland's independence, identity, and independent foreign policy decision-making (amid 'big power' pressure) (Devine, 2008: 471).</p>	<p>A 2000 Gallup survey showed that 7 in 10 Austrians support neutrality (Gärtner and Höll, 2001: 189). Reinprecht and Latcheva (2003) found that support for neutrality among the Austrian public is greater than two-thirds.</p>	<p>2 in 3 felt it was a good proposal that 'during periods of peace, Sweden should pursue a policy of non-alignment, aiming at neutrality in war' (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Riks-SOM).</p>

(Continued)

Table 1. (Continued)

Time	Actor	Ireland	Austria	Sweden
2004-date	Elite	Neutrality is redefined as non-membership of 'pre-existing military alliances with mutual <i>automatic</i> obligations'; Ireland's foreign policy is only 'partly described as neutrality' (Mansergh, 24 January 2004). Fine Gael felt Ireland should be in talks about joining a common defence and should not have to have a referendum on it. 'I think we should be worried about our lack of an adequate defence. Who will defend us if we come under attack?' (Mitchell, 2005).	Austrian elite 'endorsed a possible common European Defence Policy (Art 17 TEU), supported active Austrian participation and co-operation in a future mutual military assistance guarantee within the EU'; 'Austria will continuously assess the value of NATO membership... the option of joining NATO will be kept open' (NATO, October 2005); 'participation in Petersberg Task peace enforcement combat missions is not to be restricted by Neutrality Law' (Austria Foreign Ministry, 2011).	'Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or other Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden were affected. We must be able to give and receive military support' (MoD, 19 March 2009). 'Solidarity with the EU has meant that Sweden will not remain passive in the event of an attack on an EU/Nordic state, and expects similar assistance (Bildt, 2010:3). 'We don't call ourselves nonaligned, we never call ourselves neutral either' (Bildt, in Ritter, 5 April 2011).
	Public	No research on public opinion on neutrality has been conducted/made publicly available in the three states. 54% of Austrians raised the abandonment of neutrality as a main fear in 2004 (Neuhold in Monro, 2005: 16). Attitudes to NATO membership are solicited, e.g. a majority in Sweden are opposed to membership (<i>The Local</i> 10 April 2008; <i>Svenska Dagbladet</i> , 4 April 2009), although MoD Tolgfors says 'Membership in NATO is a "natural" step for Sweden' (<i>The Local</i> 16 February 2008).		

and the SEA may provide empirical evidence of corresponding shifts in national foreign policy values, interests and identities.

Discourse on CFSP precursors: The Dooge Report and EPC

During a Dáil Debate of 29–30 March 1985 on the Dooge report that proposed the adoption of EC common positions at the UN and ‘developing and strengthening consultation on security problems as part of political cooperation’, the Government pointed out that ‘Ireland finds itself in a different position from its partners, all of whom are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, while Ireland is neutral’ and on that basis argued against ‘proposals that seek to go beyond ... co-ordination in the area of foreign policy on the political and economic aspects of security’, because such proposals were deemed as ‘more appropriate to military alliance frameworks’, i.e. the WEU. Fianna Fáil, in opposition, rejected the idea of ‘common positions in keeping with majority opinion’ because the common position ‘will derive from a different philosophy from ours’, i.e. Ireland’s postcolonial history (the other neutrals have also used their lack of colonial status (cf. Goetschel [this issue])), declaring ‘we should not as a small country allow ourselves to be bound down by rules that will not be observed by the larger member states in a crisis situation’. The party claimed: ‘A common foreign policy is incompatible with our neutrality’ and adopted ‘a firm position of principle that we are opposed to defence being discussed by the Community’, explaining ‘the last thing the world needs today is a reinforcement of military blocs or the creation of new ones’ (*Dáil Éireann*, 359: 1977–8).

This discourse indicates that elite socialization did not influence the position of Irish political elites by the 1980s. Instead, EEC pressures were instrumentally resisted, seen in the government’s conclusion that: ‘There is no case to be made for sacrificing our vital interests solely for the sake of being regarded as “good Europeans”’ (*Dáil Éireann*, 359: 1962). In the end, the Irish government expediently deemed EPC as compatible with neutrality on the basis that EPC excluded military aspects of security. However, Title III of the SEA was deemed ‘contrary to the declared Labour party policy on [“positive”] Irish neutrality and nonalignment’ (*Irish Times*, 2 October 1986) and it was noted that ‘people who actually use that formulation [“neutrality outside military alliances”] and who vote for it are the very people who ... pretend not to understand what it means when they have so narrowly and tightly defined it like this to make it a nothing’ (*Seanad Éireann*, 115: 1125–6).

In the ensuing Irish referendum debate on the SEA, the government made a distinction between the political and economic aspects of security and the military and defence aspects of security, arguing that cooperation by the member states with regard to the former, in order to closely coordinate their positions, does ‘not affect Ireland’s position of neutrality outside military alliances’. Although the SEA referendum in Ireland was passed, neutrality was the top substantive policy concern of a significant minority of voters that opposed the SEA (*Irish Times*, 20 May 1987). It is clear from the political discourse and referendum voting behaviour that active neutrality was seen as incompatible with the foreign and security policy provisions of the Single European Act by the

(neutrality-supportive) elite and public, whereas for the (SEA-supportive) elite, the singular, negative content of ‘military neutrality’ was deemed compatible.

It would seem unlikely that the persistent silence on neutrality could have prevailed in the accession debates in Austria, Finland and Sweden some twenty years later (12 June 1994, 16 October 1994, 13 November 1994), given the advanced level of public communications available and the less paternalistic nature of Nordic political systems, coupled with the advent of specific TEU-based developments in the area of foreign, security and defence policy. However, the framing of solely *economic* reasons for accession during the Irish referendum campaign (Maher, 1986: 86, 117) was also achieved in the debates in Austria and Sweden (see Bieler, 2000: 55, 63, 83, 102, 118), indicating evidence of instrumental, materialist drivers in the elite pursuit of the economic benefits of membership, due to lobbying efforts of business interests, rather than the socialization of elites into the political norms and visions of the EEC/EU.

During the 1990s, Swedish elites effectively reversed the decades-long prioritization of neutrality over economic and political integration. Swedish premier Olof Palme had rejected EC membership in the 1970s because plans for supranational economic cooperation and extensive foreign policy cooperation would compromise neutrality (Lassinantti, 2001: 103). The first Swedish application of 26 July 1967 sought participation ‘under a form compatible with the continuation of its policy of neutrality’. In Austria in April 1970, SPÖ leader Bruno Kreisky formed Austria’s first post-war Socialist government and he vigorously promoted Austrian ‘active’ neutrality over closer association with the EEC (Bischof, 2007), while attempting to persuade leaders in the EEC that it would be in their interest to allow Austrian membership under terms that preserved its neutrality (Schlesinger, 1972: 105; Bieler, 2000: 124). This era ended in 1983–84, when a coalition government of the SPÖ and ÖVP parties asserted ‘a regional rather than global line of vision’ (Kramer, 1996: 169) and asked to be admitted to the EEC – by the time of accession, both parties had argued that neutrality was obsolete.

1990s concepts of neutrality: EU accession, the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty

In the post-Cold War era, the EC accelerated its plans for deeper integration, culminating in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) or ‘Maastricht Treaty’. Maastricht was significant because it signalled that plans to fulfil a common defence would be put in place. Under Article J.4.2, the Western European Union (WEU) would develop, formulate and implement EU defence (OJ C 191, 29 July 1992). This clearly presented a challenge to Ireland as well as the three neutral states attempting to accede to the EU by squaring their neutrality-embedded applications with the circle of European foreign, security and defence policy ambitions. Austria applied for membership in July 1989 with the intention of maintaining its neutrality, which it saw as a specific contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe (Rendl, 1998: 163; Bieler, 2000: 64).⁴ Sweden had declared its intention to apply for EC membership with continued adherence to neutrality ‘in our national interest’ in parliament on 26 October 1990 (Bieler, 2000: 81) – prior to the drafting of the TEU. Days prior to submission of the application on 1st July 1991, Prime Minister

Ingvar Carlsson noted on 14 June 1991 that: 'Sweden cannot take part in a common defence policy or a mutual defence commitment within the EC framework, without foregoing its policy of neutrality'. The Finnish government submitted its application on 17 March 1992, after the TEU was drafted. The following section focuses on dynamics behind the accession-led changes to the label and discursive content of neutrality.

In Finland in the early 1990s, membership of the EC was discussed at the elite level, although the March 1991 election was characterized by academics as a 'conspiracy of silence on the EC issue', particularly in relation to security policy implications (Arter, 1995: 369). In the wake of the Maastricht Summit agreement on the TEU's common defence provisions, two months before the delivery of the Finnish application to join the EC and six months after the Commission had recommended a re-definition of Austrian neutrality, the Finnish government redefined neutrality after the termination of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA) in a 9 January 1992 communication to parliament saying, 'the core of Finnish neutrality can be characterised as military non-alignment', at a time when surveys showed that a majority of the population did not want to abandon active neutrality and barely half were prepared to join the EC (Arter, 1995: 368–9). Noting this revision of the concept of neutrality in its opinion on Finnish membership of the EU, the European Commission took the view that 'even reduced as it is to its core of military non-alignment', Finnish neutrality's anticipated effects in peacetime 'can pose problems for the Union, to the extent that they might cause Finland to oppose itself systematically to certain actions which, in its view, could be prejudicial to its policy of neutrality, *or what is left of it*' (November 1992c: 22, 23, emphasis added).

Drawn up in August 1991, the Commission opinion on Austria's application for membership cited 'the compatibility of permanent neutrality with the provisions of the existing Treaties' as a problem in relation to the future development of the Community and, specifically, in relation to 'obligations entailed by the future common foreign and security policy' (1991: 18) including 'whether Austria would also be able to contribute to a peace-keeping operation decided upon by the Community (the political union) without the UN's legal endorsement' (1991: 17). The Commission suggested 'a re-definition' of Austria's neutrality as a possible 'solution' to the 'problem' (1991: 17). At this time, three-quarters of Austrians surveyed said they would not give up 'active' neutrality for the sake of accession to the EC (Benke, 2003: 182) and between 64% and 82% of people said they would give up EU membership rather than neutrality if the two proved incompatible (Neuhold, 1992: 101–3 cited in Bieler, 2000: 92) (see Table 1). The European Commission's report on the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland surmised that: 'The question of neutrality, and its compatibility with the common foreign and security policy, is however a particular concern' (1992a: 18).

In view of the Commission's demand to re-define Austrian neutrality, it was unsurprising that neutrality was not explicitly mentioned in Sweden's 1991 application letter. The neutrality-adherent basis of Sweden's previous application effectively changed after a new four-party coalition took office: the European Commission opinion on Sweden's 1991 application for membership noted that the 'national consensus' on Swedish neutrality 'is now evolving' and had 'changed' under premier Carl Bildt, such

that: ‘Today, the Swedish Government declares that the term “policy of neutrality” is no longer an adequate description and prefers instead to speak of “Swedish foreign and security policy with a European identity”’ (July 1992b: 18). At that time ‘71% of all Swedes wanted the government to continue with neutrality’ (Luif, 1995: 248) and a steady average of 63% favoured ‘military non-alignment’ from 1997 to 2005 (Stütz, 2008: 34 (translated from Swedish); see Table 1).⁵ Prior to the Swedish accession referendum on 13 November 1994, the European Parliament argued that the ‘concept of neutrality should be redefined’ (1994b, point M) and ‘that a common defence ... should include mutual assistance obligations similar to ... Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty’, (1994b, point 14) such that ‘all Member States ... will take steps to become full members’ of the WEU. Future membership of the WEU military alliance and the assumption of its mutual defence clause did not feature in any of the accession or Irish TEU referendum debates (Huldt, 1994: 132; Bieler, 2000: 90; Devine, 2009: 474) in a ‘zone of meaningful silence’ that extended across the four states.

In all three accession cases, Treaty-based developments of the form and function of EU ESDP preceded elite engagement in a number of different discursive strategies altering the status and concept of neutrality: in the three referendums (1) the terms of neutrality were left vague, (2) neutrality was labelled as meaningless, and (3) in accordance with the Commission’s suggestion, neutrality was characterized as requiring redefinition to be compatible with EU CFSP while simultaneously reassuring the public that neutrality would not be harmed by EU membership (cf. Agius, [this issue]; Huldt, 1994: 124, 130; Bieler, 2000: 92). At the state level, with the knowledge that the public adhered to ‘active’ neutrality and considered it incompatible with, and more important than, EU membership, the elite revised the concept of neutrality *de facto* to a narrow one of ‘non-membership of a military alliance’ or ‘military non-alignment’ to accord with the terms of EC/EU membership, just as the Irish government and elite had done prior to 1972: the referendum debate showed that understandings of neutrality differed remarkably between the people and the politicians (Benke, 2003: 193–5) (see Table 1). Thus, linked to this elite revision of the concept of neutrality (Penttilä, 1999: 174), Fanning identifies that ‘in Ireland, as in the other neutral states of Europe ... a credibility gap is opening between the preferred options of the foreign policy elites and their respective publics’ (1996: 147).

Is there evidence that elite socialization effects are driving the divergence of public and elite neutrality preferences at this stage of the development of ESDP/CSDP? The elite socialization literature distinguishes between (1) a ‘logic of consequentialism’ that treats actors as rational, goal-oriented and purposeful; they engage in strategic interactions using their resources to maximize their utilities on the basis of given, fixed and ordered preferences, and (2) a ‘logic of appropriateness’ implying that social norms and institutions have formative effects in constituting identities and interests as well as regulating behaviour; actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what is proper given a rule system. Socialization in the adoption of Community rules ‘implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions’ (Checkel, 2005: 804).

It is possible that the Finnish elite were following a ‘logic of consequentialism’ in being open about their acceptance of a future military alliance commitment in a mutual defence/assistance clause as part of their membership, partly because of their own perception of their security environment, and partly because of socialization effects from EU partners, underpinned by the Finnish elite desire to be part of the future ‘in-group’ of ‘Europe’ (Browning, 2008: 51–62, 269). Shortly after joining, the Finnish Commander-in-Chief, General Gustav Häggglund stated that Finland enjoys ‘the implicit collective security provided by EU membership’ (1995: 19). In this respect, the Finnish elite differed from the Austrian and Swedish elite, whose membership bids were driven by perceived material incentives and economic benefits rather than security considerations that were strongly supported by large transnational companies, employers’ associations, the financial markets and, as ‘behind-the scene lobbyists for European integration’, the defence industries (Bieler, 2000: 108, 109, 119; Ojanen, 2002: 186). In all three cases, as in the Irish case, it appears that instrumental reasons underpinned the elite re-conceptualization of neutrality and desire to join the EU, rather than socialization effects.

Once involved in the EU institutions after membership, it is possible that elites may have switched from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness, in the *de facto* abandonment of ‘non-alignment’ through a further re-definition to make it compatible with the adoption of the CSDP and, in particular, the mutual defence clause in the Lisbon Treaty, and their parallel adoption of ‘solidarity’ as a cornerstone of their states’ foreign, security and defence policies. The concept of ‘solidarity’ is seen in the 1994 Austrian White Book on CFSP priorities that committed the Austrian government to the further development of the EU as a *solidarity community* (Rendl, 1998: 165). The same ‘solidarity’ theme is notably present in Swedish elite discourses some eight years later, for example, ‘through our membership of the EU we participate in a *solidaristic community* whose main purpose is to prevent war on the European continent’ (*Dagens Nyheter*, 14 February 2002, translation by Annika Bergman, 2004: 8) and another seven years later (post-Lisbon), the solidarity concept involves military assistance, as many Swedish officials ‘talk about strong European and American ties and “solidarity” with neighbouring Nordic and Baltic states, even to the extent of military assistance’ (Stavrou, 2009). This desire to participate in EU common defence may be evidence of: (1) instrumental motives seen through strategic adaptation (not likely given the lack of threat to the neutral states) or the desire to belong to the ‘in group’ rather than constitute an ‘out group’ given the perceived benefits of the former and costs of the latter, or (2) evidence of learning in the adoption of EU security and defence policy values, leading to a change in identity and interests that gives priority to the promotion of solidarity within the EU over the values of neutrality that had previously shaped national foreign policy preferences.

Solidarity, the WEU–EU merger and the assumption of WEU’s mutual defence clause

In terms of defence, the Amsterdam Treaty stated that the WEU should support the EU in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy, and, accordingly, that the EU should foster closer institutional relations with the WEU ‘with a view to the

possibility of the integration of the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide'. However, this proposed merger of the WEU military alliance with the EU, including the transfer of its mutual defence clause to EU member states, is incompatible with the re-formulated concept of 'military neutrality' adhered to by the four governments in the 1990s (see Table 1); e.g. the Irish government's White Paper on Foreign Policy anticipated a proposal to include a mutual defence commitment of the WEU's Article V in a future EU Treaty through which 'member-states undertake to assist another member that is the object of an armed attack' (1996: 143) and acknowledged that, in such a scenario, Ireland's adoption of the WEU's mutual defence clause 'would not be compatible with our existing policy of neutrality' (1996: 144). The Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner also admitted that 'membership in NATO or the WEU precludes neutrality' (Naegele, 2001).

The Irish White Paper maintained that 'the Government will not be proposing that Ireland should seek membership of NATO or the Western European Union, or the assumption of their mutual defence guarantees' (Ireland, 1996: 147); this stance was reiterated throughout the 1990s in the Irish Parliament (Ahern (in opposition) *Dáil Éireann*, 473: 608; 506: 197–8). The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson had reported to the Swedish EU parliamentary committee: 'To argue against a WEU–EU integration is one of the most important defense priorities in Amsterdam' (Eliasson, 2004: 19): 'Sweden was actively working against [the WEU's] Article V, and thus mutual defence commitment, being included, even in the form of a separate protocol [to the Amsterdam Treaty]' (Ojanen, 2000: 17). Finland and Austria differed, saying they were prepared to agree on a merger of the EU and WEU as long as the WEU's collective defence commitment was not transferred to the EU. The premises behind the neutrals' attempts to prevent the wholesale transfer of the WEU's functions to the EU proposed by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain, and the merger of the two organizations, were: (1) to preserve the last remnant and core of military non-alignment; (2) to enable a clear distinction to be drawn between security and defence, with the concept of security covering Petersberg Tasks (incorporating the low end of military intensity – peacekeeping) and the concept of defence including territorial defence and the protection of the vital interests of the Member States (including the high-end of military intensity triggered by adherence to a mutual defence clause); and (3) to substitute the mutual defence clause requiring territorial defence of member-states with the Petersberg Tasks, as a way to promote an alternative 'crisis management'-focused use of the CFSP 'to develop the potential of the EU as a peace project' (Ojanen, 2005: 408) and to emphasize a 'soft' security profile of the EU to match with neutrals' previous operational norms (see Agius, 2006: 168). The proposal succeeded in terms of the treaty wording that came into force on 1 May 1999; however, the WEU–EU merger was initiated seven months later by a European Council decision at Helsinki in December 1999.

Concepts of neutrality in the 2000s: Nice Treaty ESDP and Lisbon Treaty CSDP⁶

A year later, the Nice Treaty had repealed the Amsterdam Treaty's clause on merger of the WEU and the EU: 'the 'deletion' of the WEU ... is also reflected in the ongoing process of transfer of WEU capabilities and institutions ... to the EU' (Trybus, 2005: 101); e.g. the

transfer of WEU Military Staff, the Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies (Western European Union, 2000: 2) was completed by 1 January 2002 and the WEAG functions were later transferred to the European Defence Agency (EDA). The last remaining function was the WEU's Brussels Treaty Article V mutual defence clause, which, if transferred to the EU, would lead to the termination of the WEU (Reichard, 2006: 220).

As discussed earlier, in the early 1990s, Treaty-based developments of the form and function of EU ESDP preceded significant changes of elite discursive strategies on neutrality: the same pattern can be observed in the early 2000s. In the run-up to the transfer of the WEU's mutual defence clause to the EU, the Irish government admitted 'we do not have anything like an appropriate definition [of military neutrality]' (Roche, *Dáil Éireann*, 554: 413). The Swedish government announced a new security doctrine that completely dropped the reference to neutrality (Monaco and Riggle, 2002; Möttölä, 2002: 24) and adopted a so-called 'unilateral Article 5' (EU-27Watch, 2009) (see Table 1).

The Lisbon Treaty agreed by member-states' governments in December 2007 has the stated aim of having a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters, which is envisaged as contributing 'to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance' (Protocol 10). The Treaty includes the failed European Constitution's solidarity and mutual defence clauses, a common arms policy, Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence and extensions to the Petersberg Tasks to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, and post-conflict stabilization, and provides for combat units to be deployed outside of EU borders to undertake unlimited EU military action (Protocol 4 Article 1), provisions that are seen as the 'backbone' of the Lisbon Treaty (Euractiv, 13 February 2008). The following Table 2 briefly evaluates the compatibility of the CSDP provisions with the elements of the concept of 'active neutrality' embodied in earlier state practices and currently supported by public opinion (as detailed earlier), before turning to the main focus of this article, the inclusion of the mutual defence clause in the Lisbon Treaty.

The insertion and wording of the mutual defence clause

The Working Group (WG) set up to draft the provisions on CSDP in 2002 rejected the suggestion of the inclusion of the WEU's mutual defence clause in the Treaty (European Convention WG, 2002: 21–2), but in a *dirigiste* move (Reichard, 2006: 202) the Secretariat, overseen by the Praesidium, decided to place the mutual defence clause into a protocol to the draft Treaty for states to opt in to (European Convention Secretariat, 2003: 35). Notably, the Irish government's re-defined 'military neutrality' concept (20 March 2003) reflected this reality: 'non-membership of a military alliance, and, specifically, non-membership of an alliance *with a mutual defence commitment*' (*Dáil Éireann*, 563: 722 emphasis added). In the Autumn of 2003, Franco Frattini, the then Italian Foreign Minister during the Italian Presidency of the EU, changed the draft text by moving the mutual defence clause –

if one of the Member States participating in such cooperation is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other participating States shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (18 July 2003)

Table 2. Neutrality and CSDP: Compatible or competing?

Element of neutrality	Status	Lisbon Treaty Article/Provision ⁷
Non-involvement in war/ other countries' wars	Incompatible/ Competing	Art. 28A(7) requires a response 'by all means in their power' to member states suffering armed aggression / Art. 28B permits unlimited military EU action that neutrals may be associated with.
Self-defence only	Competing	Art. 28B provides capacity for pre-emptive action.
Primacy of the UN/ UN peacekeeping only	Incompatible	Under Art. 28A(1) EU peacekeeping missions do not require a UN mandate (neutrals' proposals for this were rejected) Art. 2(5) /Art. 10A merely declare respect for the UN Charter principles.
Anti-militarism	Incompatible	Art.28A(3) commits member-states to improvements to military capabilities that are said to require increased spending and a common arms policy within the European Defence Agency Art.28D.
Impartiality/Anti-big power politics/ independent decisions amid 'big power' pressure	Incompatible	Art. 10 and Art. 280E(2) lift the ban on the use of enhanced cooperation in the field of ESDP; Art. 28A(6) provides for permanent structured cooperation to enable larger states to execute 'most demanding' military acts; combined with Art. 15B / Art. 201A Constructive Abstention, unanimity is in practice a <i>non sequitur</i> . Art.280B/Art 11(2-3)/Art.16b eliminate abstaining states' independence in action.
Non-aggression/ Peace-promotion	Competing	Neutrals' Convention representatives' proposed clauses to limit EU military action/repudiate war were rejected.
Non-membership of a military alliance	Incompatible	Art. 28A(7)" transfers the WEU mutual defence clause to the EU, completing the WEU-EU merger (as a result the WEU was officially terminated in March 2010); thus the EU has subsumed a military alliance.

from the protocol into the main text of the Constitution, making it equally binding on all member-states, and handed this new version of the draft Constitution to the meeting of the heads of government convened to agree the final text (Tiilikainen, 2006: 61).

The Irish foreign minister, Brian Cowen, along with the foreign ministers of Sweden, Finland and Austria, attending the IGC, wrote a memo to Frattini stating 'provisions containing formal binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our security policy or with our constitutional requirements'. Cowen knew that the provision eliminated the government's concept of 'military neutrality' and so 'warned of the possible outcome of a referendum in Ireland for any new EU treaty that does not confirm Irish neutrality' (Kirk, *EUobserver*, 8 December 2003) and suggested changing the wording of the mutual defence clause in (the then draft Constitution) Article 40(7) to:

If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, *it may request* that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter (Cowen, 5 December 2003, emphasis added).

This wording removed the automatic *obligation* to respond ‘by all means in their power’ and replaced it with a mere *request* for assistance that was left open to members to respond to or not. The only grounds Britain, France and Germany were prepared to yield were: (1) deletion of the words ‘military or other’ to semantically ‘demilitarize’ the clause, i.e.:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power

and (2) to add on the so-called ‘Irish clause’, the phrase used by successive Irish governments in EU Treaty referendum campaigns to persuade Irish voters that neutrality is safeguarded: ‘This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’. Naert (2005: 193) points out that

the stipulation that this obligation of aid and assistance ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’ raises questions for the precise scope of this obligation. This is so because the said mutual assistance obligation is clearly incompatible with the neutrality of the four neutral Member States.

Given the lack of impact of the clause, it appears to be included as a rhetorical device for elites to use in their referendum campaign arguments to persuade the Irish electorate that neutrality is preserved. Naert surmises that ‘if the true scope of the safeguard clause is to exempt the neutral Member States from the obligation to provide assistance, it would have been preferable to have made the exemption more explicit’ (2005: 194). Irish elites have acknowledged that the ‘Irish clause’ does not mean that neutrality is safeguarded: ‘sometimes that sentence is presented as if it meant that there never will be any change in our policy and Ireland will always be neutral. If that is the meaning which is attempted to be attached to it, it is dishonest because it is not sustainable’ (*Dáil Éireann*, 506: 187).

After the Irish electorate had rejected the Lisbon Treaty in a referendum on 12 June 2008, in part due to concerns over neutrality, the Irish government formulated a declaration in June 2009 stating that,

it will be for Ireland, acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of military neutrality, to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of armed aggression on its territory

in a new attempt to convince the Irish public that ‘military neutrality’ was preserved in preparation for a re-run of the referendum. Legally, ‘in view of the textual obligation to provide aid and assistance “by all the means in their power” such a general freedom of response does not seem correct’ (Naert, 2005: 194). The government conflated the automatic nature of the obligations of the mutual defence clause (MDC) with the solidarity clause (in the TFEU) that is not automatic: ‘the other Member States shall

assist it *at the request* of its political authorities' and involves an undefined response: 'arrangements ... shall be *defined by a decision* adopted by the Council' (emphasis added). (The Swedish government adopted a similar discursive strategy using a 'meaningful silence' by saying that NATO *handles* mutual defence guarantees but remaining mute on the Lisbon Treaty MDC (see Tolgfors, 2011).) The former maximalist, automatic obligation violates the duties and obligations of neutrality in the Hague Conventions that require a state to avoid being drawn into a conflict (1) through abstention from entering into any alliances or (2) agreements regarding the safety of the territory of a third party, or (3) undertakings to provide aid and assistance either directly or indirectly.

The genealogy of the meaning of 'by all means in their power' backs up Naert's legal interpretation. The USA rejected Britain's proposal to extend the Brussels Treaty Article V mutual defence clause to North American states to form an Atlantic Alliance in 1949, precisely because the phrase 'by all means in their power' meant that signatory states could not choose their response to an armed attack: 'the Brussels Treaty's strong collective-defence commitment ... would commit Canada and the United States to automatic participation in defence against any attack on another member of the pact. US negotiators knew that such a provision would immediately be seen by the Congress as undercutting its constitutional powers for declaring war' (Sloan, 2006). Instead, the USA included in the Washington Treaty Article 5, a clause specifying that every nation may determine for itself what kind of aid is to be provided (Wiebes and Zeeman, 1983: 358), i.e. 'by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, *such action as it deems necessary* ...' (emphasis added). Hummer confirms that 'there remains no doubt that the neutral and non-aligned Member states are under the obligation to mutual (military) assistance in the case of armed attack' (2006: 67). Thus, the Irish government's definition of 'military neutrality' (Government of Ireland, 1996: 120) and the Swedish and Finnish understandings of 'non-participation in military alliances' – 'A merger of the EU with the WEU is ... not consistent with Sweden's and Finland's policy of "non-participation in military alliances"' (Laursen, 1997: 12) – are both incompatible with the inclusion and adoption of the Article 42.7 mutual defence clause in the Lisbon Treaty. Post-Lisbon, the elite concepts of 'military neutrality' and 'non-participation in military alliances' have been effectively re-defined to mean (1) membership of the WEU military alliance through the 'back door' of a merger (Laursen, 1997: 16) and (2) the assumption of its Article V mutual defence clause (Quille (2010) notes: 'Most observers agree that the Lisbon Treaty formula matches the guarantee of the Brussels Treaty'). As Ojanen surmises, 'the term "military non-alliance" has been defined in such a way that it has close to no meaning at all' (2005: 410).

With the ratification of Article 42.7, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland also became member-states of an EU collective defence, because according to the EU 'Collective defence refers to participation in the defence of Europe under the Treaties of Brussels (Article V) [and Washington (Article 5)] which stipulate that in the event of aggression, the signatory states are required to provide assistance ...' (*europa* glossary 'collective defence') and they also participate in the EU's 'common defence policy comprising a mutual assistance clause such as that contained in the WEU [and NATO] Treaties' as defined by the European Parliament. Citing the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and its Article 42.7, and the continuation of members' strong commitment 'to the principle of mutual defence of article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty' in that context, the WEU was officially terminated on 31 March 2010 (Presidency of WEU Permanent Council, 2010).

The end of military neutrality and non-participation in military alliances signals a further widening of the gap between public and elite foreign policy preferences in Austria, Sweden and Ireland. Before considering this gulf as an effect of elite socialization, it is worth understanding the rationale, values and motives that separate elite and public opinion on military alliance commitments and mutual defence clauses.

Public fears of alliance membership consequences and mutual defence clause obligations

Public opinion in neutral states would reject the WEU–EU merger because (1) membership of an alliance is perceived to involve the imposition of political restrictions on an independent foreign policy and (2) due to a fear of the military consequences of the obligations stemming from the mutual defence clause that could involve the state in wars. During the World War era, the Swedish public shared the elite mistrust of alliances after the failings of the League of Nations in their support for armed neutrality (Agius, 2006: 72). In the post-War era, Irish elite and public adherence to neutrality was based on a mistrust of ‘great powers’, and a fear that joining a military alliance would mean automatic involvement in wars, without having a say or control over such decisions (*Dáil Éireann*, 152: 549–51). Because of this, de Valera was wary of plans for a federal EU, of any ‘attempt to provide a full-blooded political constitution’ and argued ‘we would not be wise as a nation in entering into a full-blooded political federation’ that would involve a military alliance (*Dáil Éireann*, 152: 550). During the Cold War era, neutrality meant rejecting the balance of power and resisting spheres of influence maintained by military force (Joenniemi, 1989: 55). Public opinion in the neutral states continued to distrust alliances and to desire to avoid large state ‘power politics’. In the years prior to accession to the EEC and EU, the elite in Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland attempted to ‘define neutrality ... as a policy related to NATO, *not as a policy related to war and military alliance*’ (McSweeney, 1985: 128, emphasis added).

An examination of public opinion data from the 1990s and 2000s shows that the publics in Austria, Sweden and Ireland continue to adhere to and support the concept of ‘active’ neutrality. For example, Bjereld and Ekengren (1999: 508–10) found that independence and other values relating to the ‘core’ of Swedish foreign policy, such as active internationalism, support for the UN, a commitment to solidarity with the developing world, disarmament, peacekeeping and mediation are linked to support for neutrality (which they also refer to as ‘non-alignment’). In Irish public opinion in the 2000s, the values of independence and patriotism underpin support for ‘active’ Irish neutrality (Devine, 2008: 480, 471) comprised of the same elements in Table 1. Public opinion research (e.g. Wodak et al., 1998; Benke, 2003) also shows that Austrian neutrality is a doctrine of both the state’s political self-definition and of national security, being positively linked to Austria’s position in the international system, security and peace, freedom and sovereignty regained, self-determination, democracy and the welfare state (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003: 447). Neutrality is an important component of peoples’ national identity (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003: 453–4; Devine, 2008: 473, 475, 480; European Parliament, 1994a) and linked to attitudes toward autonomy and the delegation of power (specifically an independent foreign policy unfettered by EU membership) and an international, global justice and development-oriented world-view

over and above a regional, European interests-based one (Bjereld and Ekengren, 1999: 515; Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003: 456) (cf. Goetschel, [this issue]).

Bjereld and Ekengren found that neutrality-supportive Swedes (73% of the population) were critical of EU membership if it meant restrictions on political autonomy (1999: 515) especially ceding power and autonomy to other states through alliance commitments (1999: 514). NATO membership was seen as increasing the danger that Sweden might become embroiled in military action against its own will (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 6 March 2002). In Austria, the left-wing parties see joining a military alliance as abandoning a clear orientation towards peace and buying into the logic of the arms race (Benke, 2003: 283). Surveys conducted in 1998 and 2000 showed that roughly seven in ten Austrians support neutrality and oppose Austria's membership of NATO. Emphasizing the mutual obligation of collective defence pushed opposition to NATO membership higher across all three neutral states' populations (Gärtner and Höll, 2001: 189). This desire to avoid alliance commitments and safeguard independent foreign policy in the context of big power pressures indicates that neutrality supporters would not wish their state to adopt the mutual defence clause of the WEU or become members of the organization, either directly or indirectly through a WEU–EU merger (see Table 1).

Post-Lisbon 'solidarity', mutual/common defence and the EU as global actor/ player

In the late 2000s, none of the elites in neutral states seemed willing or able to drop the term 'military non-alignment'. For example, Bildt maintained 'Sweden is military non-aligned', but supported the practice of Article V, 'Sweden will not remain on the sidelines should another EU member state or Nordic country be struck by disaster or attack. We also expect these countries to do the same if a similar crisis were to befall Sweden' (Bildt, 13 February 2008; see also Parliamentary Defence Commission's reports and Swedish Ministry of Defence press releases stating 'We must be able to give and receive *military* support', 19 March 2009). This reverses Bildt's 1992 position that 'Swedish defence is for Sweden only' (quoted in af Malmborg, 2001: 176). The Austrian political elite switched to the formula 'solidarity within Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe' (Neuhold, 2005: 14). However, if elite socialization has occurred, the continuity rhetoric should not obscure evidence of discourses infused with specific EU foreign policy values and positions. Bildt's (2008) speech emphasizing,

the Lisbon Treaty means that much better conditions have been created for the European Union to function as a *stronger global player*.... The Government will shortly introduce a national strategy for Sweden's involvement ... the goal is to link foreign aid and defence policy closer together. In order to become an *increasingly important global actor*, the European Union needs to strengthen its relations with the wider world

does signal Swedish adoption of the EU's interests in global actor status and the associated values and identity. Preferences for EU common defence and a global actor identity are not due to an instrumentalist response to changed security situations because 'any form of direct military attack ... is deemed to be unlikely within at least the next ten

years' in Sweden (2003: 14), Ireland (2000: 2.2.1) and Austria (2001: 2), including terrorist attacks (Ireland, 2000: 2.3.10).

The Swedish Defence Policy paper (Sweden, 2004: 6, emphasis added) claimed, 'there are serious, transboundary threats to our security' that must be 'assessed in a *wider perspective and not just nationally*' with the response designated as 'participation in [EU] crisis management operations' to 'promote international peace and security for Sweden, the EU as a whole and the world at large'. The EU is the prism for the effort to secure peace and EU defence policy is straightforwardly mapped onto Swedish defence policy in the adoption of EU rationale towards unidentified threats. Thus, it is difficult to understand neutrals' acceptance of the Lisbon Treaty's MDC as a realist, cost-benefit or strategic security decision, unless it is understood as supporting the larger member-states' ambition to see the EU balancing vis-à-vis the USA, although this balancing interest could also be adopted as a result of non-coercive persuasive arguments, indicating elite socialization effects.

The binary elements in the definition of social learning – 'a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts, acquire new interests and preferences in the absence of obvious material incentives' (Checkel, 1999: 548) – can be difficult to separate out, because socialization through interaction in institutions may be intrinsically linked to less obvious but nonetheless materialist incentives or rewards at the level of individual agents, and the latter may induce the former, in a delayed gratification loop-back effect. Looking at the role of agents articulating attitudes against neutrality and in favour of a European identity underpinned by a common defence, for example, Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister in charge of the EU Presidency who, as mentioned earlier, wrote the mutual defence clause out of the protocol and into the main text of the draft Constitution, took up the European Commission's Justice and Security portfolio, 22 November 2004 to 8 May 2008. As Austrian Foreign Minister from February 2000 to October 2004, Benita Ferrero-Waldner had proposed the inclusion of a mutual defence clause in the Treaty in 2000 (Bischof et al., 2006: 235) and demanded coordination of the communications to Frattini in December 2003 between the neutrals on the mutual defence clause (Bischof et al., 2006: 236) that ultimately resulted in the four neutrals agreeing to adopt the MDC. Having played an instrumental role in the elimination of neutrality and non-alignment in the EU, she was appointed as Commissioner for External Affairs, 22 November 2004 to 1 December 2009. John Bruton, as a 'leading member' in the drafting of the Constitution, expressed the Irish position on 'the need for a common European defence' (CONV 27/02, 10 April 2002: 47), oversaw the agreement on the Constitution and its mutual defence commitment as part of the Praesidium of the Convention, and was subsequently appointed the European Commission's Ambassador to the United States, 9 December 2004 to 31 October 2009. The current Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, who as premier in the early 1990s jettisoned neutrality as the cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy prior to securing membership of the EU, is known to have ambitions to secure an EU or other international post (US embassy in Stockholm 2009/#09STOCKHOLM599). Finally, at the state level, covert factors of sanctions induced by the more influential, larger, member-states against smaller states struggling with economic downturn, banking failures, agricultural difficulties or fines in relation to a failure to adhere to EMU rules or environmental laws, for example, may play a role in

what seems to be socialization towards EU solidarity and balancing vis-à-vis the USA through argumentative persuasion. Argumentative persuasion involves ‘changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of *overt coercion* ... leading to interest redefinition and identity change’ (Checkel, 1999: 549; Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue]). With respect to the neutrals’ re-definition of interests and adoption of EU rationale of participation in crisis management operations as the way to secure peace for the EU and the world, discursive evidence does indicate a fundamental shift away from old values and practices related to [anti-] militarism and neutrality thus far.

Neutral state elites have displayed a shift in values by (1) undertaking a new premise that ‘diplomatic activity or economic activity without the potential to resort to military power could only be partially successful’ (Salmon, 2005: 375); (2) adopting the provisions on an EU armaments policy overseen by the EDA, for example, compared with the stance in the 1980s whereby ‘Finnish neutrality policy is an even-handed armaments policy, based on procurement in both the East and the West as well as on considerable domestic production’ (Gilberg, 1985: 50); (3) moving from a global world-view of normative equality exercised independently, to a regional, European interests-based one, substituting ‘empathy with the victims of power politics pursued mainly by the larger states’ (Keatinge and Tonra, 2002: 18) with a view that ‘it will be in Ireland’s national interest, and in the interest of the EU, to be able to intervene in a peacemaking or peacekeeping role in conflicts ... even as far away as Africa’ because the ‘result of a prolonged conflict’ – ‘huge flows of refugees towards Europe’ – requires ‘responding militarily to such situations’ (Bruton, 2002: 52); (4) aligning with larger powers on the validity of international law, seen in Swedish premier Carl Bildt’s decision to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in a break with the principles of international law it had followed in the past (Agius, 2006: 156); (5) subverting the desire to resist big power pressure in agreeing to ‘constructive abstention’ in defence, thereby subjecting themselves to big power pressure *not* to object to high-intensity missions supported by Permanent Structured Cooperation; (6) reconfiguring neutrals’ former peacekeeping concept with the UN in order to implement the EU’s high-intensity Petersberg Tasks: for example, in 1996 it was said that ‘the Government do not intend that Ireland will be involved in tasks of combat forces in crisis management’ (1996: 140), but legislation was changed to facilitate Irish troop operations ‘at the sharp end of peacekeeping.... This is exactly the capability the United Nations does not have’ (Oireachtas, 2008), in the full knowledge that “‘peacemaking’ by military means ... may come close to war making’ (Bruton, 2002: 48). Thus, neutrals’ own internal standards of appropriateness are arguably inconsistent between pre-accession practices of neutrality and the foreign policy practices, ambitions and world-view advanced in the Lisbon Treaty.

Conclusion

Neutrality has been conceptually moved and re-arranged by agents playing a complex strategic long-term game in seeking the introduction of new and evolving elements of EU security and defence policy (see Agius, [this issue]). Elite concepts have moved from ‘active’ or ‘positive’ ‘neutrality’ prior to EU membership to ‘military neutrality’, ‘military non-alignment’ and ‘non-membership of military alliances’ post-membership. Since the

drafting of the EU Constitution, the concepts have been whittled down further to 'non-membership of military alliances with mutual defence clauses' and minimized compared with the increased emphasis on 'solidarity' principles in elite foreign policy discourses. In the post-Lisbon Treaty era, the concept, in legal and political terms, is dead: despite the rhetorical mentions of 'non-alignment', the old post-accession meaning created by the first elite re-definition of the concept by the governments of Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland has been now reversed to antithetically mean membership of the WEU military alliance through a merger and the assumption of its mutual defence clause. The various elements of the CSDP provisions in the Lisbon Treaty are either incompatible or competing with the concept and values of 'neutrality' adhered to by Irish, Austrian and Swedish publics. To answer Putnam's (1988: 434) paraphrased question: in the end, 'neutrality', 'military neutrality', 'non-alignment' or 'non-membership of a military alliance' are not retained.

Due to elite reluctance to face consequences from 'active neutrality' supportive publics, brusque rhetorical homage is paid to the term 'non-alignment' in neutral foreign policy discourses, followed by a heavy emphasis on provisos for European military solidarity and pledges to engage in practices arising from adherence to a mutual defence clause. Public opinion data gathered in the pre-membership era showed two-thirds majority support for 'neutrality', and this level of support continues in post-membership surveys that ask for public opinion on 'non-alignment' (see Table 1). Given this evidence, the scope and content of the neutrality concepts supported by public opinion in these states have a near-zero degree of norm overlap with elite concepts of 'non-alignment' and indicate further distance apart in terms of implementation. There is a significant potential dissonance between the type of foreign policy expectations held by the public in their understanding of neutrality vis-à-vis the foreign policy options that elites could and intend to exercise within the strategic and political context of CSDP. The process of incorporating the provisions in the Constitution/Lisbon Treaty and the nature of the referendum campaigns (and lack thereof) to ratify the texts raise questions about the internal legitimacy of EU constitutional development and defence integration with respect to the neutral states. For a CSDP that is supposed to be based on the principles of democracy-promotion, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the lack of those qualities inherent in the processes underpinning the policy's formulation and inception indicates a specious, if not apocryphal, beginning.

This analysis of changes in neutrality and the compatibility of neutrality concepts with CSDP, including the identification of the discursive strategies employed by elites vis-à-vis neutrality-supportive publics, provides the basis for predictions of discursive tactics, referendum campaign content and governmental practices in other neutral or non-allied states that may apply for EU membership in the future, such as Switzerland. If changes in elite preferences and identities are stemming from elite socialization at the EU level through learning and argumentative persuasion, one could expect stability of these decisions, relative to changes wrought through adaptation in response to external factors (see Beyer and Hofmann, [this issue], Figure 2). On this understanding, it is unlikely that the neutral state elites will re-adopt any form of a neutrality policy in the near future, and once opinion poll data show sufficient signs of public attitudes softening

in the context of concerted and sustained NATO and EU public diplomacy efforts, neutral elites' token reference to 'military non-alignment' will be dropped from official discourse (e.g. Bildt and Stubb in Ritter, 2011) to catch up with the current legal and political reality.

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Notes

1. Blending a number of premises and conceptual tools from distinct scholarly schools, e.g. discourse theory, CDA and critical constructivism, into one approach is widely practised (Miliken, 1999: 228, 236).
2. The Swedish defence policy 2005–2007 summary refers to the 'solidarity clause which is part of the new European constitution' (2004: 8) but omits any mention of the MDC. These meaningful silences are sufficiently sedimented and politically significant to re-title this article 'Neutrality in the Development of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy: Entering the Zone of Meaningful Silences'. I thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
3. Notably, elites imply that their populations were fully aware of these defence commitments and their implications for neutrality at the time of accession: e.g. Austria claims: 'In joining the EU, Austria adopted ... provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article J.4 of [the TEU] opened up the perspective of a common defence policy, which could in due course lead to a common defence. In the referendum held in June 1994, two-thirds of the Austrian population voted in favour of accession to the EU under these conditions.'
4. Austria's application was 'on the understanding that its internationally recognized status of permanent neutrality, based on the Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955, will be maintained' (Austria, 1989) although the Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine (2001: 4) states 'Austria joined the EU without a reservation regarding its neutrality'.
5. State-sponsored opinion polls do not ask peoples' attitudes to 'neutrality', soliciting opinions on 'military non-alignment' instead.
6. The Constitutional Treaty process of negotiations on CSDP, 2000–2005, is the main focus of the article; notably, no further CSDP discussions or changes were initiated in the later Lisbon Treaty drafting process, 2005–2007.
7. All Article references in this table are drawn from the 'Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community' in the *Official Journal of the European Union* (C306, Vol. 50, 17 December 2007). The Article numbers were subsequently revised in the production of a Consolidated Version of the above texts (Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 83, 30.3.2010)). The main focus of this present article is on the mutual defence clause: Article 28A(7) in this table. Article

28A(7) was subsequently re-numbered Article 42.7 in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of Lisbon: the latter is referred to throughout the main text of the article.

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